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ON CUSTODIAL PARENTS: SEX-BASED 
DISCRIMINATION? 
By ALIX GRAVENSTEIN PASTIS* 
t INTRODUCTION 
Residence restrictions are frequently imposed on the custo-
dial, but not the noncustodial, parent. l These restrictions come 
into play when the custodial parent wishes to move with the 
child, the noncustodial parent opposes the move, and a court is 
called upon to resolve the dispute.2 The court will do so based 
upon a determination of what it judges to be in the best inter-
ests of the child.3 The best interests inquiry ultimately resolves 
itself into a question of whether the custodial parent's reasons 
for making the move are sufficiently substantial to outweigh the 
noncustodial parent's interest in existing visitation privileges.' A 
custodial parent who violates the residence restrictions may lose 
custody of the child,'1 forfeit child support,6 or be subjected to 
*J.D., Ohio State University; B.S., Case Western Reserve University. Attorney 
Baker & Hostetler, Cleveland, Ohio. The author wishes to thank Professor Nancy S. 
Erickson for her guidance and critical evaluation of the Article. In addition the author 
acknowledges the helpful comments of Patricia Screen and Mike Pastis. 
1. See infra notes 11-21 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra notes 22-40 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 42-64 and accompanying text. 
4.Id. 
5. See, e.g., Courten v. Courten, 92 A.D. 2d 579, 459 N.Y.S. 2d 464 (1983); Brandon 
v. Faulk, 326 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1976); 
Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283; 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973). Cf. Giachetti v. 
Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (no change of custody, but injunction 
restraining removal). 
6. See, e.g., Pattison v. Pattison, 208 So. 2d 395 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 252 La. 
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contempt proceedings.7 
In today's highly mobile society, residence restrictions cre-
ate two forms of post-divorce inequality for women because the 
custodial parent is usually the mother.8 First, there is a dispa-
rate impact on women because only the custodial parent is bur-
dened with residence restrictions. The noncustodial parent, usu-
ally the father, remains free to relocate at will. Second, the so-
called "best interests" standard permits the court to interject 
personal values that are frequently sex-biased, into the decision 
to permit or deny relocation. Yet even assuming that residence 
restrictions are grounded in sex-neutral justifications, they have 
a disparate impact on women that reinforces a traditional sex-
based hierarchy; they effectively grant the noncustodial father 
the power to veto a proposed move unless the custodial mother 
can show "substantial" reasons to legitimate her decision to 
move. 
Residence restrictions are disturbing not only because of the 
potential for sex discrimination, but also because of the harm 
they entail for all involved. Custodial mothers are often able to 
fulfill their desire to move to join a new husband9 or accept a 
new job10 only at the risk of losing custody of their child. The . 
personal, emotional, or economic harm to the custodial mother 
may not always be obvious. She may simply forego an opportu-
D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 144 N.J. 
Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976) (move allowed but child support reduced). 
7. See, e.g., Pattison v. Pattison, 208 So. 2d 395 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 252 La. 
168, 210 So. 2d 52 (1968); Entwistle v. Entwistle, 61 A.D.2d 380, 401 N.Y.S.2d 213 
(1978). 
8. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP (1980). 
9. See In re Marriage of Smith, 290 Or. 567, 624 P.2d 114 (1981); Giachetti v. 
Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (where permission to move was de-
nied). But see Martinez v. Konczweski, 85 A.D.2d 717, 445 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1981), aff'd, 57 
N.Y.2d 809, 441 N.E.2d 1117, 455 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1982); Pattison v. Pattison, 208 So. 2d 
395 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 252 La. 168, 210 So. 2d 52 (1968) (where permission to 
move was granted). 
10. See, e.g., Priebe v. Priebe, 81 "A.D.2d 746, 438 N.Y.S.2d.413 (1981), aff'd, 55 
N.Y.2d 997, 434 N.E.2d 708, 449 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1982); Weiss v. Weiss, 76 A.D.2d 863, 428 
N.Y.S.2d 506 (1980), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981) 
(where the move was denied). C/. Helentjaris v. Sudano, 194 N.J. Super. 220, 476 A.2d 
828 (App. Div. 1984); Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 505 P.2d 14 (1972) (mother 
obtained gainful employment 140 miles from her former husband's home). But see Jafari 
v. Jafari, 204 Neb. 622, 284 N.W.2d 554 (1979); Tandy v. Tandy, 42 lli. App. 3d 87, 355 
N.E.2d 585 (1976) (where the trial court gave permission to move and was affirmed on 
appeal). 
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nity that requires relocation under the belief that a residence 
restriction requires it; she may bargain away the noncustodial 
parent's financial obligations such as child support to avoid liti-
gation or the effect of an adverse decision after trial. 
The potential for harm does not end with the state's inter-
vention into the custodial mother's personal decision making. 
Men, particularly noncustodial fathers, can also be harmed. A 
noncustodial father's contact with his child could be perma-
nently denied or crippled because a custodial mother faced with 
limited, high-cost options might secretly move and conceal the 
child's whereabouts to circumvent the restriction. Men are also 
harmed when they marry women with children from a prior 
marriage. Such men may be faced with two unpalatable options: 
foregoing a relationship with a woman burdened by a residence 
restriction or assuming the burden themselves. Finally, if cur-
rent residence restriction analysis is applied to custodial fathers 
on an equal basis they could obviously be harmed in the same 
way as custodial mothers. 
Of course, the ultimate loser in a dispute of this nature is 
the child of the divorced couple. He or she could not be left un-
scathed by a parental dispute that rises to the level of requiring 
judicial intervention or circumvention of the legal process. 
This Article will generally refer to the custodial parent as 
"mother" and the noncustodial parent as "father" because that 
describes the typical alignment of the parties and highlights the 
sex discrimination issues. The term "child" will be used regard-
less of how many children are involved because the analysis does 
not turn on the number of children. This Article will demon-
strate that residence restrictions are not consistent with con-
cepts of custody and general rules on change of custody. And, it 
will show that residence restrictions are sex-based in their appli-
cation, justification, and effect because they exist to protect only 
the interests of the noncustodial father. If most custodial par-
ents were men, residence restrictions would cease to exist or 
would be analyzed differently; the focus would finally be on the 
real interests at stake for all involved. 
3
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II. RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS AND THEIR OPERA-
TION 
A. NATURE AND SOURCE OF RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS 
Restrictions on relocation of the mother can be, imposed by 
statute,!1 a separation agreement/2 a divorce decree,!3 or in a 
post-divorce proceeding. A post-divorce proceeding may take 
one of several forms: a petition for modification of the decree to 
prohibit removal,14 a request for injunctive relief to restrain relo-
cation to protect visitation privileges in the divorce decree,15 a 
petition for change of custody under the theory that the move is 
a "change of circumstances" warranting such an extreme mea-
sure/6 or a combination of these devicesP These are often initi-
ated by the mother's petition for removal18 or for modification of 
the residence restriction or visitation privilege.19 Such restric-
tions may prohibit the mother from making an intrastate20 or an 
11. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.175(3)(1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:2-2 (West 1976). 
12. Restrictions may be negotiated in a settlement agreement. Because their inter-
pretation is governed in part by questions of merger and contract law, relocation deci-
sions based on an interpretation of such agreements are beyond the scope of this Article. 
13. See, e.g., Henry v. Henry, 119 Mich. App. 319, 326 N.W.2d 497 (1982); 
Helentjaris v. Sudano, 194 N.J. Super. 220, 476 A.2d 828 (App. Div. 1984). Accord Jafari 
v. Jafari, 204 Neb. 622, 284 N.W.2d 554 (1979) (restrictions imposed in decree of 
dissolution). ' 
14. See, e.g., Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 505 P.2d 14 (1972); In re Mar-
riage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1978). 
15. See, e.g., Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. 
denied, 342 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1977); Weiss v. Weiss, 76 A.D.2d 863, 428 N.Y.S.2d 506 
(1980), aft'd, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981). 
16. See, e.g., Gunter v. Gunter, 93 m. App. 3d 1043, 418 N.E.2d 149 (1981); In re 
Marriage of Smith, 290 Or. 567, 624 P.2d 114 (1981). 
17. See, e.g., In re Marriage, of Martinis, 51 Or. App. 861, 627 P.2d 504 (1981) (mo-
tion for change of custody or restraining order); In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 
822 (Iowa 1978) (petition for change of custody or residence restrictions). 
18. See, e.g., Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82 (N.D. 1981); Arquilla v. Arquilla, 85 
Ill. App. 3d 1090, 407 N.E.2d 948 (1980). 
19. See, e.g., Brandon v. Faulk, 326 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 336 
So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1976); In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1978). 
20. See, e.g., Lebowitz v. Lebowitz, 403 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)(trial court 
decision restricting residence to local county in divorce decree was reversed as abuse of 
discretion and modified to restrict residence to state); Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 
485, 505 P.2d 14 (1972) (trial court granted father's motion to prohibit relocation within 
state but 140 miles from father's home); Cheatham v. Cheatham, 344 So. 2d 525 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1977) (restriction of residence to 50-mile radius unreasonable); Groh v. Groh, 
110 Wis. 2d 117, 327 N.W.2d 655 (1983) (court lacked power to make order requiring 
mother to relocate 235 miles within state); Helentjaris v. Sudano, 194 N.J. Super. 220, 
476 A.2d 828 (App. Div. 1984) (error to condition continued custody on mother's return 
to state and residence within a 40-mile radius of father). 
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interstate21 move with the child without first obtaining permis-
sion from either the court or the father, regardless of her reasons 
for wanting to move. 
A mother may want or need to move in order to fulfill her 
obligations to support and rear her child.22 Her desire to move 
may also be affected by other considerations that benefit the 
child by furthering the mother's personal interests.23 For exam-
ple, if she marries a nonresident of the jurisdiction, the couple 
may decide it is in the new family's interest to live in his state 
rather than in hers.24 The prospect of employment for herself,25 
her new spouse,26 or her fiance27 may motivate the proposed 
move. She may wish to move closer to relatives in order to gain 
assistance with the upbringing of the child, or for emotional sup-
port after divorce.28 Her health29 or the child's30 may motivate a 
desire to move. Educational opportunities may not be available 
locally.31 She may view the move as necessary to establish a new 
life for herself apart from her ex-husband,32 to avoid post-
21. See supra notes 9 & 10. 
22. See, e.g., Gottschall v. Gottschall, 210 Neb. 679, 316 N.W.2d 610 (1982); Tanttila 
v. Tanttila, 152 Colo. 446, 382 P.2d 798 (1963); Groh v. Groh, 110 Wis. 2d 117, 327 
N.W.2d 655 (1983). See also infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text, discussing respon-
sibilities imposed upon the custodial parent. 
23. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burgham, 86 Ill. App. 3d 341, _, 408 N.E.2d 37, 40 
(1980) (child was indirectly benefited by allowing move because custodian was happier); 
In re Marriage of Gutermuth, 246 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Iowa 1976) (move would make 
mother a happier person and better parent). 
24. See supra note 9. 
25. See supra note 10. 
26. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Feliciano, 103 Ill. App. 3d 666, 431 N.E.2d 1120 
(1981); Martinez v. Konczewski, 85 A.D.2d 717,445 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1981), aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d 
809, 441 N.E.2d 1117, 455 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1982). 
27. See, e.g., Garland v. Garland, 19 Ill. App. 3d 951, 312 N.E.2d 811 (1974); Gott-
schall v. Gottschall, 210 Neb. 679, 316 N.W.2d 610 (1982). 
28. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Young, 529 P.2d 344 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Brown v. 
Brown, 261 Iowa 591, 155 N.W.2d 426 (1968); Klein v. Klein, 93 A.D.2d 807, 460 
N.Y.S.2d 607 (1983). 
29. See, e.g., Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973); Abra-
ham v. Abraham, 44 A.D.2d 675, 353 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1974). 
30. See, e.g., Tandy v. Tandy, 42 Ill. App. 3d 87, 355 N.E.2d 585 (1976); In re Mar-
riage of Feliciano, 103 Ill. App. 3d 666, _, 431 N.E.2d 1120, 1125 (1981). But see Dozier 
v. Dozier, 167 Cal. App. 2d 714, 334 P.2d 957 (1957) (move denied where child's asthma 
and pneumonia attacks would be aggravated). 
31. See, e.g., Middlekauff v. Middlekauff, 161 N.J. Super. 84, 390 A.2d 1202 (App. 
Div. 1978); Harris v. Harris, 57 Misc. 2d 672, 293 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Fam. Ct. 1968). 
32. See, e.g., Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973); Broom-
field v. Broomfield, 283 So. 2d 839 (La. Ct. App. 1973); In re Marriage of Gutermuth, 246 
N.W.2d 272, 275 (Iowa 1976). 
5
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divorce tensions,33 or to make a "fresh start" and establish her 
authority as head of the post-divorce family unit.34 Of course, 
the motivating reason may also be a conscious intent to frustrate 
visitation.35 In contrast to the number and variety of reasons 
that might individually or collectively motivate the mother's de-
sire to move, the father's interests in resisting the move are 
much more circumscribed. 
At best, the father opposes relocation to protect the child 
from specific harm36 or to preserve presently exercised visitation 
privileges by keeping the child near the father's residence.37 In-
creased distance may curtail or, in extreme circumstances, elimi-
nate visitation because of work or economic constraints. Non-
financial considerations, such as new marital obligations, may 
also diminish the opportunity to visit over greater distances. 
Qualitatively, alternative arrangements may not be comparable 
to existing arrangements for nurturing a parent-child relation-
ship. Thus, even where the mother bears part of the expense 
associated with long distance visitation, existing visitation may 
be diminished. 
On the other hand, a father may resist relocation simply as 
a matter of marginal inconvenience where, for example, he is not 
currently fully exercising existing opportunities for visitation or 
has, himself, previously relocated farther away.3S On an even less 
benign level, he may challenge the move simply to gain bargain-
ing leverage to reduce child support or other financial obliga-
tions,39 or to spite the mother. When the father is required to 
33. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gutermuth, 246 N.W.2d 272 (Iowa 1976). 
34. Note, The Judicial Role in Post-Divorce Child Relocation Controversies, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 949, 951 (1983)[hereinafter cited as Note, Judicial Role]. 
35. In re Denberg, 34 Misc. 2d 980, 986, 229 N.Y.S.2d 831, 837 (Sup. Ct. 1962). 
36. See, e.g., Gunter v. Gunter, 93 TIL App. 3d 1043, 418 N.E.2d 149 (1981) 
(mother's bigamous remarriage and threat of physical harm to child); Dozier v. Dozier, 
167 Cal. App. 2d 714, 334 P.2d 967 (1959) (child's health). 
37. See, e.g., Priebe v. Priebe, 81 A.D.2d 746, _, 438 N.Y.S.2d 413, 414 (1981) 
(forty-five percent of time spent with child); Jafari v. Jafari, 204 Neb. 622, _, 284 
N.W.2d 554, 555 (1979) (daily visits). 
38. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burgham, 86 lli. App. 3d 341, _, 408 N.E.2d 37, 38 
(1980) (after divorce, father moved to Virginia and then New York, but successfully op-
posed mother's move to California at the trial level); Gray v. Gray, 57 lli. App. 3d 1, _, 
372 N.E.2d 909, 911-12 (1978) (father had moved intrastate and visits were reduced from 
weekends to "perhaps" once a month; trial court denied permission for mother's move, 
reversed on appeal). 
39. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
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pay child support, he may feel the quid pro quo is a right to 
convenient visitation and a right to exercise some authority in a 
situation where he is otherwise powerless. "The lack of authority 
or clearly defined value has a particularly demeaning signifi-
cance for fathers .... [I]t is especially hard for the outside fa-
ther to be stripped of rank and command and yet be expected to 
provide financial support."40 
Because either a request for permission to move or a resi-
dence restriction violation frequently result in a change of cus-
tody at the father's request,41 the operation of residence restric-
tions will be examined and criticized in light of the burden that 
this type of "traditional" restriction places on the mother's free-
dom to move. 
B. OPERATION OF THE "TRADITIONAL" RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS 
Once a residence restriction case is brought before the court, 
the court decides according to what it perceives to be in the 
"best interests of the child," or, in a few jurisdictions, the "best 
interests of the post-divorce custodial family unit."42 The court 
exercises a breadth of discretion under either standard which is 
subject to few restraints. The trial court is often not required to 
make findings of fact, to write an opinion, or to reconcile the 
case with precedent.43 In general, an appellate court will not re-
verse unless the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. 
Under such circumstances, the ability to determine when a court 
has acted upon an inappropriate factor is necessarily limited. 
Yet, many decisions are reversed on appeal because the court 
used an improper burden of production44 or gave the evidence 
40. Note, Judicial Role, supra note 34, at 952 n.14 (quoting M. HUNT & B. HUNT, 
THE DIVORCE EXPERIENCE 181-82 (1977». 
41. See supra note 5. 
42. See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 123-30 dis-
cussing the nature of the physical and psychological interests of the child. 
43. See Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication; Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 253-54 (Summer 1975). 
44. See Henry v. Henry, 119 Mich. App. 319, 322, 326 N.W.2d 497, 499 (1982) 
(mother must meet D'Onofrio standard, not statutory "best interests" factors because 
court would have to reconsider factors previously considered in awarding custody that 
are likely to be inappropriate in a removal hearing). Cf. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 
399 (Minn. 1983) (motion by the mother to relocate shall be granted unless opposing 
party establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the move is not in the best 
interests of the child). 
7
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improper weight under the best interests standard.45 As will be 
shown below, the reported cases demonstrate the sex-biased val-
ues that underlie a court's decision in the allocation of the bur-
den of production and the nature of the standard of proof. 
1. Burden of Production 
Courts use presumptions affecting the burden of production 
to ·assist in their decisions under the best interests standard. 
Some jurisdictions recognize presumptions favoring the mother's 
right to move under the theory that it is generally in the best 
interests of the child to remain with the custodial parent be-
cause it promotes continuity with the primary caretaker46 and 
the child's sense of security.47 However laudable this presump-
tion may appear, the advantage it affords the mother in litiga-
tion is illusory. 
Because the presumption benefiting the mother is an advan-
tage only after judicial intervention, she still must spend the 
time and incur the expense of litigating the matter. In order to 
meet her burden of persuasion under the best interests inquiry, 
she must show a substantial reason to legitimate her move.48 
Even if the court ultimately allows the move, her success may be 
undercut by a reduction in child support or a requirement to 
defray the father's increased costs of visitation.49 Finally, there 
45. See, e.g., Weber v. Weber, 84 A.D.2d 940, 446 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1981) (where 
mother married an out-of-state resident, it was error to deny permission to relocate); 
Middlekauff v. Middlekauff, 161 N.J.Super. 84, _, 390 A.2d 1202, 1206 (App. Div. 1978) 
(where the mother sought to further her education and had made detailed arrangements 
for the child, it was error to deny removal based on finding that living in Manhattan 
would not be as conducive to the welfare of the child as living in a New Jersey suburb). 
Ct. Brown v. Brown, 261 Iowa 591, 155 N.W. 2d 426 (1968) (where testimony related 
entirely to effect move would have on the mother and did not refer to the child except to 
suggest that the move would allow the mother to be "better able to do things for the 
kids," it was error to permit removal). 
46. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 93 A.D.2d 807, 460 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1983). 
47. See, e.g., Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1983); Bernick v. Bernick, 
31 Colo. App. 485, 487-88, 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972); Cheatham v. Cheatham, 344 So. 2d 
525, 527 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977). 
48. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gutermuth, 246 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Iowa 1976) 
(mother found to have burden of proof and permission to move granted); In re Marriage 
of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 825-26 (Iowa 1979) (burden of proof on mother and permis-
sion to move granted). 
49. See, e.g., D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, _, 365 A.2d 27, 33 (Ch. 
Div. 1976) (child support reduced); Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82, 84 (N.D. 1981) 
8
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is always the risk that the court will reject the presumption that 
it is in the best interests of the child to remain with the mother, 
and adopt 'the more common presumption that favors the fa-
ther:50 that frequent and regular visitation best serve the child's 
interests. 51 The underlying notion reflects a preference for main-
taining the status quo, "since any change would be from known 
conditions proven to be conducive to the child's welfare to sur-
roundings . . . in the nature of an experiment which should not 
be made."52 The court in O'Neil v. Koch53 was more candid in 
stating the true premise as "proper to emphasize the father-
[child] relationship since he is the parent who stands to lose 
contact with the child against his will if removal is approved. "54 
This premise reflects the view that the mother should be held 
responsible for the consequences of her own willful actions and 
the father deserves sympathy when actions are forced upon him 
against his will. Such a view, however, does not reflect the true 
nature of the post-divorce interests involved. This view not only 
abrogates judicial responsibility to decide what is in the best in-
terests of the child, but also calls attention to the sex discrimi-
nation issues. 
2. Standard of Proof 
In most jurisdictions, the court makes the decision about 
whether or not to allow the mother to move with the child sup-
posedly so as to promote the so-called "best interests" of the 
(mother required to pay travel expenses of child to and from North Dakota for six-weeks 
summer visitation); Broomfield v. Broomfield, 283 So. 2d 839, 840 (La. Ct. App. 1973) 
(costs of transporting child from California to Louisiana divided equally between the 
parents for eight-weeks summer visitation where mother moved to improve her wages 
from $75 to $125 per week); Martinez v. Konczewski, 85 A.D.2d 717, 445 N.Y.S.2d 844, 
(1981),5 N.Y.2d 809, 441 N.E.2d 1117, 445 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1982) (mother required to pay 
father's travel to Florida and child's travel to New York). 
50. Compare Tandy v. Tandy, 42 m. App. 3d 87, 355 N.E.2d 585 (1976) (burden on 
father) with Arquilla v. Arquilla, 85 m. App. 3d 1090, 407 N.E.2d 948 (1980) (burden on 
mother to show real advantage to herself and child). But compare Tanttila v. Tanttila, 
152 Colo. 446, 382 P.2d 798 (1963) (burden on party seeking removal which was the 
mother; regular visits presumed preferable to long visits at father's expense) with 
Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 505 P.2d 14 (1972) (presumption that mother as 
custodial parent made decision in attempt to meet best interest of child). 
51. See Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 176, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380-81, 436 N.Y.S.2d 
862, 865-66 (1981). 
52. Brown v. Brown, 261 Iowa 591, _, 155 N.W.2d 426, 428 (1968). 
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child. 55 However, the court usually does not focus on the welfare 
of the child; its focus is on the competing parental "rights." The 
decisions usually juxtapose the father's visitation privilege 
against the mother's reasons for moving.56 The heavy eviden-
tiary burden that this standard places on the mother is typified 
by the stringent New York "exceptional circumstances" test.57 
In New York, a mother must show a unique or firm job of-
fer, exceptional health or educational needs, or a "dramatic" 
change of locale which was necessitated by a new marriage. 58 
Anything short of these exceptional needs may result in denial 
of permission to move and a temporary or permanent change of 
custody. 59 This burden is only marginally different from the bur-
den imposed in New Jersey under D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio,60 a 
decision which is gaining acceptance in a number of 
jurisdictions.61 
55. See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 572 (1968). 
56. See Comment, Post-Divorce Visitation: A Study in the Deprivation of Rights, 
27 DE PAUL L. REV. 113, 118 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Deprivation of 
Rights}. The "best interests" standard has been roundly criticized as giving the court no 
substantive guide lines and the opportunity to disguise the real basis for decision. See, 
e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
(1979); Henzey, Visitation by a Non-Custodial Parent: What is the Best Interests Doc-
trine?, 15 J. FAM. L. 213 (1976-1977); Uviller, Father's Rights and Feminism: The Mater-
nal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107 (1978); Mnookin, supra note 43. 
57. See Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 176-77,418 N.E.2d 377, 380-81, 436 N.Y.S.2d 
862, 865-66, (1981) (citing Strahl v. Strahl, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 
N.Y.S.2d 636 (1980) where the "exceptional circumstances" test was created in the con-
text of a relocation controversy between parents who had joint custody). Because of the 
different assumptions upon which joint custody is based, joint custody relocation contro-
versies are not considered in this Article, nor should they have any controlling influence 
in context of traditional custody. 
58. Id. 
59. See, e.g., Priebe v. Priebe, 81 A.D.2d 746, 438 N.Y.S.2d 413, 414 (1981) (tempo-
rary custody given father until mother relocated to New York where prescribed visitation 
could be carried out; mother's showing of limited employment in her field in the local 
area and a job already obtained out of state was not an exceptional circumstance which 
could sustain petition to have limited support increased); Courten v. Courten, 92 A.D.2d 
579, _, 459 N.Y.S.2d 464, 464 (1983) (transfer of custody to father, inability to find 
suitable employment in New York and opportunity to build better life in California be-
cause of a better job offer there were not a compelling showing of exceptional 
circumstances). 
60. 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 
716 (App. Div. 1976). 
61. See, e.g., Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1983) (D'Onofrio approved, 
but burden of persuasion on noncustodial parent); Henry v. Henry, 119 Mich. App. 319, 
323, 326 N.W.2d 497, 499 (1982) (D'Onofrio standard adopted); Arquilla v. Arquilla, 85 
ill. App. 3d 1090, _, 407 N.E.2d 948, 950 (1980) (D'Onofrio followed); Burich v. Burich, 
10
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The D'Onofrio standard requires the mother to show that 
the move will provide a "real advantage" to the new family unit: 
herself and the child.62 In applying the standard, the court must 
consider four determinative factors: (1) whether. there is a 
"likely capacity" that the move will improve the quality of life 
for both the mother and the child; (2) whether the mother's pri-
mary motive in moving is to frustrate visitation; (3) whether the 
father is resisting the move in order to decrease existing support 
obligations; and (4) whether adequate visitation alternatives ex-
ist and whether the mother will comply with them.63 
The facts of D'Onofrio cast doubt on the real importance of 
evaluating the individual factors. For example, the court recog-
nized that the father had not fully exercised his visitation privi-
leges, in spite of the mother's encouragement, and that he had 
no objection to the move, provided that the mother was willing 
to forego the weekly child support of forty dollars for two chil-
dren. In spite of his visitation record and admitted self-serving 
motive in resisting the move, the court allowed the move but 
reduced the child support by fifteen dollars to enable the father 
to pay for transportation for visitation.64 This clearly undercut 
any "real advantage" to the new family unit. Reduction of child 
support, in order to enable visitation, reflects a value preference 
for the father's potential interests even above the child's needs. 
Thus, the D'Onofrio "real advantage" test under the best inter-
ests inquiry is ultimately no more predictable or value-neutral 
than similar analyses in jurisdictions that have not adopted any 
"test." 
. 
On the positive side, the D'Onofrio test clarifies what the 
court is balancing under the "best interests of the child" stan-
dard and it specifically requires the court to consider at least 
one of the less benign motives for resisting the move. On the 
other hand, it enlarges the "best interests" inquiry because it 
appears to permit the court to deny a move that apparently is 
not in the mother's best interests. 
In short, both the New York and New Jersey tests exem-
314 N.W.2d 82, 84 (N.D. 1981) "(cited D'Onofrio with approval). 
62. D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, _, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (Ch. Div. 1976). 
63. [d. 
64. [d. at _, 365 A.2d at 32-33. 
11
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plify the difficult standard of proof that the mother must meet 
in order to avoid a loss of custody. Both the allocation of the 
burden of production and the application of the illusory "best 
interests" standard in "traditional" residence restriction analysis 
admit value preferences that may not be sex-neutral. Because of 
the severe burdens that these restrictions place on the mother, 
they should be abandoned unless they in fact operate and can be 
justified on a sex-neutral basis. 
III. CRITIQUE OF "TRADITIONAL" RESIDENCE 
RESTRICTIONS 
If residence restrictions are in fact geared to protect the 
best interests of the child, residence restriction analysis should 
comport with traditional notions of custody and rules on change 
of custody; they should be applied on an equal basis to all custo-
dial parents regardless of sex, and the state's interests in impos-
ing and enforcing residence restrictions should be sex-neutral 
and logically furthered by such restrictions. Yet, the realities of 
the purposes, the actual implementation and the effect of resi-
dence restrictions are unsupported on grounds other than sex 
because they are contrary to concepts of custody and general 
rules on change of custody, and are sex-based in application and 
justification . 
. A. RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS ARE CONTRARY TO CONCEPTS OF 
CUSTODY AND GENERAL RULES ON CHANGE OF CUSTODY 
1. Custody 
When the traditional family unit has broken down, the 
court awards custody of the child to the parent it deems best 
qualified to protect and further the child's best interests, who is 
usually the mother.6!> The custody award implicitly, if not explic-
itly, requires the mother to assume the prior collective responsi-
bilities of both parents to supervise, educate, support and care 
for the child.66 She thus becomes head of the post-divorce family 
unit with broad powers and responsibilities to care for and rear 
65. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 55, at 573-96; J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. 
SOLNIT, supra note 56, at 19. 
66. See H. CLARK, supra note 55, at 573-74. 
12
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the child; the noncustodial father usually retains visitation privi-
leges and duty to assist in the financial support of the child.67 
The state ordinarily will not interfere in ongoing family de-
cision making to impose one method of child rearing over an-
other, except where the child is threatened with physical harm 
or the legislature has fixed the state policy, such as compulsory 
schoollaws.68 This posture reflects a policy of family autonomy, 
a recognition that parents require authority to carry out paren-
tal responsibilities, and a recognition that the family unit is best 
able to protect the child's welfare in both the traditional and 
post-divorce family.69 However, these principles of family auton-
omy evaporate in the context of residence restrictions. 
When the traditional family unit is intact, the state will not 
question a family decision to relocate because implicitly the 
child's interests are adequately protected by the family. The 
same result should obtain when the post-divorce family decides 
to move because the award of custody creates a new family unit 
necessarily predicated upon the mother's ability to protect the 
best interests of the child; principles of custody and family au-
tonomy are contrary to the imposition of residence restrictions. 
There is no greater need for the court to substitute its judgment 
of what will serve the best interests of the child in the post-
divorce family unit than in the traditional family setting. 
The court won't second guess a post-divorce family's deci-
sion to move locally although the move may equally impair the 
child's interests by necessitating a change in schools or the like. 
Challenges to intrastate moves are rarely successful.70 Where an 
interstate move is permitted, the mother has implicitly provided 
adequate protection of the child's welfare.71 Thus, there is no 
good reason to believe that she can not protect the child in all 
relocation situations. Judicial intervention on the child's behalf 
is simply contrary to the basic concept of custody. 
67. ld. 
68. ld. at 574-76. 
69. ld. 
70. See supra note 20. 
71. See Appendix for a sampling of case dispositions from various jurisdictions on 
the issue of removal. 
13
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Because state intrusion into the post-divorce family unit's 
decision to move is inconsistent with accepted notions of cus-
tody and family autonomy, it is inexplicable on grounds other 
than sex. Moving restrictions are imposed and enforced only at 
the behest of the father; that is, only if he feels either that his 
ability to judge what is in the best interests of the child is supe-
rior to the mother's, or that his interests in visitation are supe-
rior to the mother's interests in moving. When the court in-
trudes under either proposition, it implicitly rejects the rationale 
of the custody decision and gives judicial approval to the contin-
ued subordination of women, unless the circumstances would 
otherwise meet the requirements for a change of custody. 
2. Change of Custody 
Generally when a father petitions the court for a change of 
custody, he is required to show a "substantial change of circum-
stances affecting the welfare of the child."72 The father bears a 
heavy burden of persuasion due to judicial reluctance to change 
the status quo. This judicial attitude arises out of an awareness 
of the inherent potential for harm to the child from a modifica-
tion of custody, and a concern for the policies favoring the final-
ity of judgments and opposing relitigation of matters already de-
termined.73 Therefore, to comport with the normal rules on 
change of custody in a residence restriction controversy, the fa-
ther should have both the burden of production and the burden 
of persuading the court that the mother's move is not in the best 
interests of the child. 
In Garland v. Garland,74 the mother wanted to move with 
the child to join her fiance and obtain a new job.711 The court 
rejected the father's petition for change of custody76 and his 
claim of sexual bias in the allocation of the burden of proof: 
[W]hile it is true that [the father] was confronted 
here with a presumption of the continuing valid-
ity of the custody provisions [created by the bur-
72. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 55, at 598-60l. 
73. ld. 
74. 19 Ill. App. 3d 951, 312 N.E.2d 811 (1974). 
75. Garland, 19 Ill. App. 3d 951, 312 N.E.2d 811. 
76. ld. at _, 312 N.E.2d at 815 (the father argued sex-bias in favor of women be-
cause the court presumed his former wife was better able to care for their child and thus 
awarded her custody). 
14
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den and standard of proof], the presumption op-
erates to protect the welfare of the children by 
preserving the status quo regardless of which par-
ent has custody. To that extent, it is neither con-
stitutionally prohibited nor sexually discrimina-
tory . . . . Furthermore, although [there was 
expert testimony] that the separation of the chil-
dren from the father would be more traumatic 
than to most children because of their apparent 
closeness, we believe that the evidence indicates 
both were good parents and, under such circum-
stances, a separation from either would be 
traumatic.77 
433 
On the other hand, in Gunter v. Gunter,78 the father was 
granted a change of custody against the mother's removal peti-
tion because he proved that the mother had entered into a biga-
mous marriage and the child was threatened with physical harm 
from the new spouse.79 Both of these cases demonstrate how the 
general rules on change of custody should operate in a residence 
restriction controversy. The more common approach puts the 
entire burden of proof on the mother to show that the move is in 
the best interests of the child, contrary to the general rules gov-
erning changes of custody. 
For example, in Courten v. Courten,80 a transfer of custody 
to the father was upheld upon a finding that the mother's move 
to find suitable employment was insufficient reason to justify in-
terference with the father's visitation rights; the court deemed 
the mother's efforts to find work locally "unimpressive."81 The 
court found that residence with the father, with liberal visitation 
by the mother, was in their four-year-old daughter's best inter-
ests.82 The court did not discuss the general rules on change of 
custody; it merely held that a disruption of the relationship be-
tween the father and the child would not be permitted absent a 
77. ld., at _, 312 N.E.2d at 814. Accord Cheatham v. Cheatham, 344 So. 2d 525, 
527-28 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); In re Marriage of Gutermuth, 246 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Iowa 
1976). 
78. 93 TIl. App. 3d 1043, 418 N.E.2d 149 (1981). 
79. ld. 
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compelling showing of "exceptional circumstances" by the 
mother.8s The court did not consider the disruption of the rela-
tionship between the mother and the child that would result 
from a change of custody. 
In another case, a mother argued that denial of permission 
to move the child in order to join her new husband was tanta-
mount to a change of custody order, and that the proceeding 
should, therefore, be governed by the change of custody rules 
that require the father to prove a substantial change of circum-
stances affecting the welfare of the child.84 The court rejected 
the mother's argument because it deemed the case to be a re-
moval hearing controlled by the best interests standard.8!> It ex-
plained that any resulting change of custody was not caused by a 
denial of permission to move the child; the mother was not 
bound to follow her new husband-her decision to do so was 
voluntary.86 
In a similar vein, a father sought to bar his ex-wife's move 
to join her second husband and relatives by petitioning for a 
change of custody or a modification of the custody orders to pro-
hibit removal.87 The court denied the change of custody, but is-
sued a restraining order to enjoin removal even though the fa-
ther was unable to show a substantial change of circumstances.88 
The court held that such a showing was not necessary where the 
father was really just seeking to enforce the implicit restriction 
on moving created by the visitation rights in the custody or-
ders.89 In any event, the court observed that the mother was not 
without a remedy because she could seek a modification of the 
custody orders if she could satisfy the substantial change of cir-
cumstances and the best interests tests.90 
These cases are representative of the mainstream approach 
to traditional residence restriction analysis. As such, they 
demonstrate a departure from the factors and policies usually 
83. [d. 
84. O'Neil v. Koch, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1207 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). 
85. [d. 
86. [d. 
87. Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
88. [d. at 29. 
89. [d. 
90. [d. at 30. 
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considered important in change of custody litigation. These de-
partures implicate the same lack of sex-neutrality noted in the 
departures from the general concepts of custody and family au-
tonomy in residence restriction controversies: the father's post-
divorce interests are superior to the mother's although she bears 
the day-to-day responsibilities of custody. This observation is 
further reinforced by an analysis of the hierarchy of factors that 
influence the court's best interests determination. 
B. RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS ARE SEx-BASED IN APPLICATION 
Viewed objectively, there should be no requirement for the 
court to inquire into the. mother's reasons for moving. The court 
has already determined that it is in the best interest of the child 
that he or she remain with the mother when it made the custody 
award. It should follow that the child goes wherever the mother 
goes unless the father can meet the burden of proving that a 
change of custody is required. A potential impairment of visita-
tion91 should limit the court's investigation to a determination of 
what alternative visitation arrangements are feasible; it should 
not open the door to a broader intrusion into the new family's 
autonomy. However, the court does not confine its inquiry to al-
ternative visitation arrangements. Instead, the mother is re-
quired to explain or justify her reasons for moving to the court. 
A court is more likely to accept the reasons the mother of-
fers for the move if they are based upon an objectively demon-
strable fact such as remarriage or a new job already secured by 
the mother or her new husband outside the jurisdiction.92 As her 
reasons become more subjective, her likelihood of success dimin-
ishes. In such cases, the court may view her motives as unclear, 
trivial,93 or spiteful94 and therefore deny the move. Regardless of 
91. See infra notes 137-54 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra notes 24-26. 
93. See, e.g., Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 174, 418 N.E.2d 377, 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d 
862, 866 (1981). "[H]owever well intentioned, [the mother's] search is for no more than 
an 'opportunity.''' Id. In re Marriage of Martinis, 51 Or. App. 861, 864, 627 P.2d 504, 
505 (1981) (mother had not made a formal commitment to marry her fiance, had no 
personal contact with him in nine months and there was no evidence of the fiance's love 
for the child); Abraham v. Abraham, 44 A.D.2d 676, 353 N.Y.S.2d 796 (health justifica-
tion "vague"); Weber v. Weber, 84 A.D.2d 940, _, 446 N.Y.S.2d 676, 677 (1981). 
"[M]ere whim or even desire of the custodial parent to seek a new life is not sufficient." 
Id. Brown v. Brown, 261 Iowa 591, _, 155 N.W.2d 426, 427 (1968)(move motivated by 
17
Pastis: Residence Restrictions
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986
436 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:419 
what reasons the mother may submit, the courts are largely in-
consistent as to what facts will justify relocation. A sampling of 
dispositions within different jurisdictions at the trial and appel-
late levels is provided in the Appendix. These cases illustrate 
how arbitrary and sex-biased residence restrictions are when ap-
plied to specific controversies. 
When the court permits a move, it develops alternative visi-
tation provisions for the father.95 However, when a court denies 
the move, it frequently fails to mention the visitation alterna-
tives or summarily dismisses them as inadequate.96 This ap-
proach underscores the fact that a father can resist a move suc-
cessfully when the mother's reasons for relocating are deemed 
insubstantial or devalued, regardless of how insubstantial his 
reasons are for resisting the move. 
The sex-based values that influence the court in the appli-
cation of residence restrictions are also illustrated by considering 
how such restrictions operate when a custodial father is the bur-
dened party. In Bennett v. Bennett,97 the custodial father peti-
tioned the court for permission to move with the child to pursue 
an out-of-state employment opportunity.98 The Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin affirmed the trial court's decision allowing the fa-
ther to move and denying the mother's cross-petition for a 
change of custody.99 His reason for moving was deemed suffi-
cient; the court decided it was wiser to have the child remain 
distaste for local life, "story" of what awaited mother on move to join her mother "un-
certain and indefinite"). 
94. See, e.g., Courten v. Courten, 92 A.D.2d 579, 459 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1983) (likely 
that move was motivated by presence of fiance in California and intention to deprive 
father of access to child as evidenced by failure to bring child to New York for visit 
during trial); In re Denberg, 34 Misc. 2d 980, 986, 229 N.Y.S.2d 831, 837 (Sup. Ct. 1962) 
(move occasioned by "pique," not health or welfare of children and desire to punish 
father for remarrying shortly after divorce by precluding visitation). 
95. See infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text. 
96. See, e.g., Priebe v. Priebe, 81 A.D.2d 746, 438 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1981) (no discussion 
of visitation alternatives); Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), 
cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1977) (no discussion of visitation alternatives); Weiss 
v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981) (alternative visitation, 
whether voluntarily offered or judicially imposed does not necessarily meet the needs of 
the child or the father); Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1982) (removal would make continued relationship with child "impossible"). 
97. 228 Wis. 401, 280 N.W. 363 (1938). 
98. Id. at _, 280 N.W. at 364. 
99. Id. 
18
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with the father since alternative visitation arrangements were 
possible.loo This decision is notable only when compared with 
the same court's decision in Fritschler v. Fritschler,IOI a later 
case involving a custodial mother. 
In Fritschler, the major issue on appeal was whether the 
trial court had abused its discretion by denying the custodial 
mother's move and disregarding the recommendations of three 
family specialistsl02 who supported the mother's move from Wis-
consin to Colorado. 
Mrs. Fritschler's reasons for moving to Colorado 
were considered insufficient by the trial court. 
Reasons cited for her move were to escape from 
social embarrassment from her husband's reputa-
tion as a criminal law attorney, to take advantage 
of what she considered to be better job opportuni-
ties in the area of real estate sales, and better rec-
reational facilities for the children, to help relieve 
her arthritis and sinus problems, and lastly, to 
make it on her own in new surroundings without 
any help or hindrance from her former 
husband. 103 
The court stated that in Bennett, permission to move was 
premised on the theory "that what was better for the father, 
who was under a duty to provide support, indirectly benefited 
the children."104 The court found "no such benefits" in Mrs. 
Fritschler's reasons and upheld the decision of the trial court. lOIS 
There was no discussion of why the move was not "better" for 
her, nor of her duty to support and rear the child that the cus-
tody award had imposed. If the decision was founded on the sex-
based common law rule that only the father is liable for support, 
the decision cannot be upheld after Orr v. Orrl06 and Stanton v. 
100. [d. Permission to move was conditioned on the father's paying all costs of the 
mother's move to New York, if she so desired; alternatively, the father would pay all 
costs of two-months summer visitation in Wisconsin. This is not surprising considering 
the state of interstate transportation in 1938. 
101. 60 Wis. 2d 283, 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973). 
102. [d. at _, 208 N.W.2d at 338. 
103. [d. 
104. [d. at _, 208 N.W.2d at 339. 
105. [d. 
106. 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
19
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Stanton. 107 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin also reconciled its interim 
decision in Whitman v. Whitman108 on the law of the case, 
which held that removal for a proper purpose and beneficial to 
the parent may be permitted if not detrimental to the chil-
dren.109 The Fritschler court emphasized language in Whitman 
which indicated that custody necessarily implied some loss of 
freedom to relocate.11o However, the facts of Whitman are irrec-
oncilable with this reading, since the mother there was allowed 
to move when her only reason was to be closer to her parents.111 
Although Bennett reconciles neatly with Whitman with no 
explicit sex-bias, Fritschler is blatantly sex-based, and much 
more typical of the narrow view the courts take when a mother 
seeks to relocate. Bennett illustrates the focus of the court's 
analysis when the custodial parent is the father. In a random 
review of over one hundred fifty residence restriction cases, only 
one other case involved a custodial father's removal petition. 
In In re Marriage of Gautier,112 the custodial father had se-
cured employment in California after unsuccessfully seeking lo-
cal work in Oregon.113 The trial court rejected his argument that 
the mother's interests in visitation could be accomplished if she 
moved to California. The court conditioned continued custody in 
the father on his return to Oregon from California.1l4 The court 
of appeals reversed, noting that "[t]he effect of the trial court's 
order is to require him to quit his job and move back to [Ore-
gon] or lose custody of the [child]."1l6 
This decision is remarkable in that it considered the effect 
of the trial court's orders on the party burdened with custodial 
responsibilities. It was, however, a predictable deviation in view 
107. 421 u.s. 7 (1975). • 
108. 28 Wis. 2d 50, 135 N.W.2d 835 (1965). 
109. Whitman v. Whitman, 28 Wis. 2d 50, 135 N.W.2d 835 (1965). 
110. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d at _' ,208 N.W.2d at 339. 
111. Whitman, 28 Wis. 2d at 50, 135 N.W.2d at 835. 
112. 58 Or. App. 510, 648 P.2d 1308, petition denied, 293 Or. _, 653 P.2d 998 
(1982). 
113. Gautier, 58 Or. App. at _, 648 P.2d at 1309. 
114. ld. 
115. ld. at _, 648 P.2d at 1310. 
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of the general concern of protecting the father's interests, 
whether or not he is the custodial parent. Gautier demonstrates 
how residence restrictions would operate differently if the ma-
jority of custodial parents were men. It also supports the corol-
lary proposition that such restrictions would probably cease to 
exist if most custodial parents were men. 
The decision in Gautier is all the more significant because 
of the absence of any mention of In re Marriage of Smith,us In 
Smith, the Supreme Court of Oregon deferred to the trial court's 
decision, which conditioned the mother's continued custody on 
her return to Oregon from California.117 The mother had mar-
ried a long-time California resident under the mistaken belief 
that her former husband would not oppose her move to Califor-
nia with the children.lls The appellate dispositions in Smith and 
Gautier preferred the father's economic interests to the mother's 
"personal" interests. There was simply no mention of the effect 
of the trial court's order on the mother. 
In short, the substantial reasons to legitimate a move under 
current residence restriction analysis depend on gender and fluc-
tuate with the value preferences of the court. The overriding 
concern in imposing and enforcing residence restrictions stems 
from a preoccupation with the potential effects of the move on 
the father's interests, irrespective of the cost to the mother. 
There is, therefore, good reason to be concerned about the 
breadth of discretion which courts exercise in residence restric-
tion controversies. Because these restrictions operate to 
subordinate a mother's post-divorce interests and opportunities 
to the father's, they should not, absent a compelling justifica-
tion, be tolerated in today's mobile and supposedly egalitarian 
society,11e 
116. 290 Or. 567, 624 P.2d 114 (1981). 
117. Smith, 290 Or. at _,624 P.2d at 115. 
118. [d. 
119. Some commentators question the constitutionality of residence restrictions on 
the custodial parent's right to travel. See Note, Residence Restrictions on Custodial 
Parents: Implications for the Right to Travel, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 341 (1981); Bodenheimer, 
Equal Rights, Visitation and the Right to Move, FAM. Anvoc. 18 (1978); Note, Restric-
tions on a Parent's Right to Travel in Child Custody Cases: Possible Constitutional 
Questions, 6 U.C.D. L. REv. 181 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Right to Travel]. See 
also Comment, Deprivation of Rights, supra note 56 (discussing also the right to free 
association and privacy). 
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C. RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS ARE SEx-BASED IN JUSTIFICATION 
AND EFFECT 
Residence restrictions are usually justified as necessary to 
protect the child from harm or, more directly, to preserve visita-
tion.120 Close analysis, however, reveals that residence restraints 
are not logically tailored to meet the visitation concern and that 
concern can be met by alternative visitation provisions. Nor does 
protection of the child require residence restrictions, since that 
interest is adequately protected by the mother in her role as cus-
todial parent and by the existing rules governing changes of cus-
tody. Because the burdens are carried predominately, if not ex-
clusively, by women, the continued existence of residence 
restrictions is unexplainable on grounds other than sex. 
1. Protecting the Child 
The parens patriae doctrine has long been recognized to be 
part of the equity jurisdiction of the courts.l21 Under this doc-
trine, the state is justified in intervening in family decisionmak-
ing to protect the best interests of the child in matters affecting 
the child's health, education and development.122 In the context 
120. Traditionally, residence restrictions were imposed and defended to enforce the 
provisions of the home state's custody decree or to discourage forum shopping in post 
divorce matters. Note, Right to Travel, supra note 119, at 351-57. This justification is 
undercut today by the federal enactment of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 
1980 and the adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in 44 states. Id. at 
353-57. Implicitly, courts recognize the lack of any continued vitality in this rationale for 
it is barely mentioned, and given short shrift when noted at all. Compare Auge v. Auge, 
334 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1983) (related concerns addressed by the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980) with 
Girvin v. Girvin, 471 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (although a joint custody 
relocation controversy, the rationale is equally applicable to traditional custody cases: 
enforcement difficulties are not insuperable where nonresidence is in the best interests of 
the child). In addition, as early as 1938, the court in Bennett v. Bennett, 228 Wis. _, 
280 N.W. 364 (1938), recognized the inherent weakness of justifying residence restric-
tions on the ground that they were necessary to protect the home state's custody decree, 
where the parents, principles of comity, and the full faith and credit clause of the United 
States Constitution could be relied upon to furnish assistance in the recognition of the 
home state's orders in other states. Id. Because the home state decree protection ration-
ale was not relied upon as a basis of decision in any of the cases reviewed, and in the 
light of the aforementioned weaknesses in the rationale, it is not further discussed in this 
Article. 
121. See H. CLARK, supra note 55, at 572. 
122. See generally Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and 
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of imposing or enforcing residence restrictions, the court is com-
pelled to act in defense of the child's best interests because 
these interests are viewed as inadequately represented by coun-
sel for the disputing parties.123 This premise contradicts the im-
plication that the court has already found that the mother is 
capable of adequately protecting the child's best interests when 
it made the custody award.124 
The child involved in the relocation controversy has a mul-
titude of physical and emotional interests at stake. These in-
clude the subjective and objective quality of the home/25 
school,126 recreational facilities,127 childcare availability, 128 
friends,129 church,130 and overall community environment of the 
old home as compared to the proposed new residence. Due to 
the subjective component implicit in any comparison, what is 
"best" for the child's physical interests is largely indeterminate 
and must be based upon the decision-maker's values. 
Few would dispute that the child has emotional interests in 
the continuity and stability of his or her relationship with both 
the father and mother.131 The child also has an interest in hav-
ing a happy, well-adjusted custodial parent since "the fact re-
mains that ordinarily the day-to-day routine of the [child] ... 
and the quality of [his or her] environment and general style of 
life is that which is provided by the [mother] and which are, 
indeed, [her] obligation to provide."132 In the relocation context, 
these two psychological interests appear to be at odds. 
Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383, 1390-92 (1974). 
123.Id. 
124. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text. 
125. See, e.g., Knoblauch v. Jones, 613 S.W. 2d 161 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Helentjaris 
v. Sudano, 194 N.J. Super. 220, 476 A.2d 828 (App. Div. 1984). 
126. See, e.g., Gray v. Gray, 57 Ill. App. 3d 1, 372 N.E.2d 909 (1978); Middlekauff v. 
Middlekauff, 161 N.J. Super. 84, 390 A.2d 1202 (App. Div. 1978). 
127. See, e.g., Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973); 
D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27 (Ch. Div. 1976). 
128. See, e.g., Arquilla v. Arquilla, 85 m. App. 3d 1090, 407 N.E.2d 948 (1980); In re 
Marriage of Young, 529 P.2d 344 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974). 
129. See In re Marriage of Feliciano, 103 m. App. 3d 666, 431 N.E.2d 1120 (1981). 
130. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1978); Gottschall v. 
Gottschall, 210 Neb. 679, 316 N.W.2d 610 (1982). 
131. See generally Mnookin, supra note 43, at 265; J. GOLDSTEIN. A FREUD. & A 
SOLNIT. supra note 56, at 31-35. 
132. D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. at _, 365 A.2d at 29. 
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If the relocation is permitted, the continuity of the relation-
ship with the father may be impaired.133 However, if the move 
results in a change of custody to the father, the continuity of the 
relationship with the mother will definitely be impaired.134 To 
the extent that the related trauma can be viewed qualitatively, 
the continuity interest would favor continued custody in the 
mother, who has had the daily care of the child. Similarly, if the 
move is denied and the mother foregoes the move in order to 
avoid a loss of custody, the child's interest in having a happy 
mother may be impaired. Both the continuity interest and the 
"happy parent" interest thus appear to militate against any resi-
dence restraints. 
Ultimately both the child's physical and psychological inter-
ests are indeterminate due to a lack of value consensus over 
whether geographic continuity and stability is more important 
than continuity with the custodial parent, and the inability to 
predict the consequences on the child of allowing or denying re-
location.135 If the child's interests point in any direction, they 
appear to favor the mother's freedom to move. This comports 
with the policies and principles underlying the general rules on 
change of custody and the need to give the mother the freedom 
to fulfill the responsibilities imposed by the award of custody.136 
To the extent that the child's interests are indeterminate, the 
court lacks the competence to make a value and sex-neutral de-
cision in the child's best interests. Therefore, a policy of defer-
ence to the mother's decisionmaking ability is more rationally 
related to the state's interest in protecting the child. 
2. Preserving Visitation Rights 
Residence restrictions are frequently justified as necessary 
to preserve the mutual visitation rights of the father and 
133. See infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text. 
134. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
135. See Mnookin, supra note 43, at 255-68, where the author makes a very convinc-
ing argument as to the innate indeterminacy of the best interests standard. See gener-
ally J. GOLDSTEIN, A . FREUD & A SOLNIT, supra note 56, at 51-52, where the authors 
argue that the law will not act in the child's best interests, but add to the uncertainties 
when it tries to predict the future. 
136. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text. 
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child.137 However, this justification expressly subordinates 'the 
mother's interests and is fraught with contradictions that under-
cut any surface logic. 
If residence restrictions were truly designed to further the 
child's interest in developing a strong relationship with the fa-
ther, residence restrictions would look and operate differently. 
For example, the child, or the mother on behalf of the child, or 
the court would be able to compel the father's visitation and to 
impose local residence restrictions on him to ensure convenient 
visitation-an awkward and improbable system. In fact, under 
the current approach, even a father who has relocated and does 
not fully exercise visitation rights may still bar a move by the 
mother with the child.13B 
In D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio,139 the court observed: 
[A] noncustodial parent is perfectly free to re-
move himself from [the] jurisdiction despite the 
continued residency here of his children in order 
to seek opportunities for a better or different 
lifestyle for himself. And if he does choose to do 
so, the custodial parent could hardly hope to re-
strain him from leaving [the] State on the ground 
that his removal will either deprive the children 
of the paternal relationship or depreciate its qual-
137. See H. CLARK, supra note 55, at 590. There is disagreement among the courts 
whether visitation is a right of the parent, the child or a joint right of the parent and the 
child. See, e.g., In re Denberg, 34 Misc. 2d 980, 985, 229 N.Y.S.2d 831, 837 (Sup. Ct. 
1962) (natural right of father); Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 176,418 N.E.2d 377,-. 
436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (1981) (visitation is a joint right of the noncustodial parent and of 
the child); Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. 485, 487, 505 P.2d 14, 15 (1972) (" ... 
primarily a right of the [child] and secondarily a right of the noncustodial parent"); In re 
Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 1978) (derivative from and subservient to 
the best interests of the child). Cf. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNlT, supra note 56, at 
121. Visitation rights imposed by court order merely shift the power to deprive the child 
of his "basic right" to see his father from the mother to the father. Therefore, the au-
thors argue that visitation privileges are themselves a source of discontinuity aiid the 
father should have no legally enforceable right to visit the child. The authors argue, 
further, that the mother, not the court, must decide how to parent the child as the court 
lacks competence to be a "super-parent." Court intervention undermines the mother's 
authority and capacity to parent. Id. The latter position has been extremely controver-
sial. See generally Crouch, An Essay on the Critical and Judicial Reception of Beyond 
the Best Interests of the C~ild, 13 FAM. L.Q. 49 (1979). 
138. See supra note 38. 
139. 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 4.2d 27 (Ch. Div.), aft'd, 144 N.J. 352, 365 A.2d 716 
(App. Div. 1976). 
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ity. The custodial parent, who bears the essential 
burden and responsibility for the children is 
clearly entitled to the same option to seek a bet-
ter life for herself and the children.14o 
This observation disposes of any contention that the visitation 
rationale is designed to further the interests of the child's rela-
tionship with the father. It also highlights the court's hierarchy 
of values insofar as the father is free to seek a better or different 
lifestyle, while the mother may only seek a "better" life for the 
family unit. 141 
Because residence restrictions are not designed to protect 
the child's interests in visitation, their objective must be to pro-
tect the father's interests in visitation. The visitation "right" 
that is purportedly protected under this rationale is generally 
awarded to the father upon divorce under the theory that a par-
ent has a right to see his child, except where it is inimical to the 
welfare of the child.142 This right consists of the limited right to 
visit with the child at specified times. It does not include the 
right to make decisions affecting the child's needs or welfare be-
yond the specified visitation period, because such rights and re-
sponsibilities belong to the mother under the custody award.143 
Residence restrictions place an irrational and arbitrary burden 
on the mother's freedom in light of the nature of the limited 
visitation right, the fact that local restrictions are rarely en-
forced,144 and the fact that adequate alternative visitation can be 
arranged. 
When a mother moves without legal opposition from the fa-
ther, presumably the parents have negotiated satisfactory alter-
native arrangements for visitation without the need for judicial 
input. Depending on the parties' circumstances and the size of 
the state in which they reside, quantitative and qualitative hard-
ships in a permissible intrastate move are indistinguishable from 
a potentially prohibited interstate relocation. In addition, the 
court may devise an alternative visitation schedule if it deems 
the mother's reasons for moving substantial. 
140. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. at _, 365 A.2d at 30 (emphasis added). 
141. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. 
142. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
143. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
144. See supra note 20. 
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Alternative visitation may consist of longer, but less fre-
quent, visitation intervals: for instance, six-weeks summer visita-
tion and alternate Christmas holidays at the father's home;1415 
two-weeks summer vacation, one week at Christmas and one 
week in the spring at the father's home with liberal visitation 
when the father is in the child's neighborhood.146 At least one 
court has speculated that such an alternative schedule, giving 
the father constant and exclusive parental contact with the 
child, may better serve the paternal relationship than the typical 
visitation of shorter, more frequent visits.147 
In Helentjaris v. Sudano,148 the mother who had moved to 
Ohio from northern New Jersey to be closer to relatives who 
could assist her with her infant daughter and to obtain more 
flexible working hours, appealed certain provisions of the di-
vorce decree.149 The court reversed those provisions which condi-
tioned her right to continued custody on her return to within a 
forty mile radius of the father's home in New Jersey. The court 
noted that the father could relocate-an obvious, but rarely 
mentioned, alternative. 
[T]he father could himself relocate to Ohio. It is 
obviously no more difficult for him to do so than 
for the mother to return to New Jersey. The 
court's assumption or'the ability to pursue a pro-
fessional career in another state applies equally to 
both litigants. [The mother] is, moreover, no less 
alien to New Jersey than the father would be to 
Ohio, and there is no greater reason for her to 
give up the comfort of her family and a satisfac-
tory professional situation than it would be for 
him to do so. If either is to sacrifice in this re-
spect, there is indeed less reason to demand the 
sacrifice to be made by the [mother] since it is 
she, in the end, who must arrange her life in a 
manner consistent with the day-to-day burdens of 
simultaneously raising a child and pursuing a 
career.IIlO 
145. Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 83·84 (N.D. 1981). 
146. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. at -. 365 A.2d at 32-33. 
147. [d. at _, 365 A.2d at 30. 
148. 194 N.J. Super. 220, 476 A.2d 828 (App. Div. 1984). 
149. Helentjaris, 194 Super. at 220, 476 A.2d at 828. 
150. [d. at _, 476 A.2d at 832. 
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The court's approach mirrored an earlier decision by the 
same court in Middlekauff v. Middlekauff. 151 That decision re-
versed the trial court's denial of permission to the mother to 
move from Newark to Manhattan to pursue graduate studies.152 
The court recognized that the father was capable of maintaining 
visitation without judicial intervention, and observed that the 
additional visitation burden on the father was a forty-five min-
ute drive each weekend, but that "he could hardly complain of 
having to drive to Manhattan on weekends while expecting her 
to do so several times each week."l53 
As suggested by the foregoing opinions, when the mother is 
permitted to move, the parties can find alternative methods of 
accommodating visitation. Thence, residence restrictions are not 
necessary to protect the father's visitation interest. The visita-
tion rationale is also stripped of its logic in light of the fact that 
courts only explore visitation alternatives after they have de-
cided that the mother's reasons for moving are substantial.154 
Logically, if the primary purpose for enforcing residence restric-
tions were to protect the father's visitation rights, it would start 
and end with a formulation of substitute visitation arrange-
ments. 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
Reforms are required in the statutory and decisional law in 
order to curb sex discrimination, to preserve parental and per-
sonal autonomy, and to protect the children of divorced parents. 
The starting point should be that the law impose no residence 
restrictions on the post-divorce family unit. The parties should, 
however, remain free to negotiate reciprocal residence restric-
tions, provided certain procedural safeguards are followed. The 
court's function would thus be properly limited to modifying ex-
isting visitation schedules and enforcing privately negotiated 
agreements. To implement this proposal, state legislatures 
should repeal statutes requiring court permission or consent of 
the noncustodial parent to relocate155 and the following policies 
151. 161 N.J. Super. 84, 390 A.2d 1202 (App. Div. 1978). 
152. Middlekauff, 161 N.J. Super. 84, _, 390 A.2d 1202, 1206 (App. Div. 1978). 
153. [d. at _, 390 A.2d at 1209. 
154. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
155. See. supra note 11. 
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should be adopted.156 
First, statutes governing traditional custody awards should 
be amended to specifically preclude application in a relocation 
controversy to ensure that courts do not embark on a renewed 
"best interests" inquiry that is appropriate only to the initial 
custody award.157 Such an amendment should serve to empha-
size that the court has already chosen the custodial parent best 
qualified to protect the welfare of the child. It would underscore 
the fact that a proposed move does not, by itself, justify relitiga-
tion of this matter. It should make clear that the court's duty in 
a relocation controversy is limited to determining alternative 
visitation arrangements when the parties are unable to agree on 
these matters without court intervention, without regard to the 
custodial parent's reasons for moving. 
Second, statutes governing change of custody litigation 
should be amended to state specifically that relocation, without 
more, is not a "substantial change of circumstances" meriting a 
change of custody. This amendment is aimed at correcting cur-
rent analysis in many jurisdictions that erroneously places the 
burden of proof on the custodial parent seeking relocation over a 
change of custody petition.158 It underscores the fact that the 
heavy burdens of proof imposed in general change of custody 
litigation are designed to protect the status quo of existing cus-
tody arrangements and not existing visitation arrangements. 
The burden of proof should remain on the parent requesting a 
change of custody. Further, it should explicitly bar a change of 
custody based on necessary changes in visitation unless the-non-
custodial parent bears the burden of showing specific harm to 
the child resulting from the move.159 
Third, a court should, upon motion by either party, modify 
existing visitation schedules to accommodate the parties' 
changes in proximity. The court may require the parties to share 
increased costs of visitation proportionate to their ability to do 
156. Some of the proposals in this Article agree with suggestions made by a student 
commentator in Note, Judicial Role, supra note 34, at 967-73. However, they differ sig-
nificantly in perspective and in the degree of restraint proposed. 
157. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra notes 72-90 and accompanying text. 
159. See Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393 399 (Minn. 1983). See also supra note 47. 
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so. The court should not, however, reduce child support or other 
economic obligations of the noncustodial parent to the custodial 
parent. Although a move may necessitate a change in visitation 
arrangements, it does not follow that the move reduces the 
child's needs for economic support, or the noncustodial parent's 
duty to provide an aliquot share.160 To reduce financial obliga-
tions would penalize the custodial parent for exercising the free-
dom to relocate. This policy should serve to eliminate the risk of 
a noncustodial parent seeking alternative visitation privileges 
merely to gain an economic advantage.161 
Fourth, a court should not allow the parties to impose resi-
dence restrictions by agreement unless such restrictions are 
based upon a reciprocal agreement where both parties reasona-
bly limit their freedom to move. To be enforceable, the agree-
ment must provide for arbitration of disputes with a pre-deter-
mined, mutually approved, arbitrator under general principles of 
arbitration. Further, the agreement must be separately signed by 
both parties in the presence of independent counsel and with 
full disclosure with respect to the dangers of such mutually obli-
gatory restraints. 
Moreover, judicial responsibility to protect the child is not 
abrogated by honoring such mutual agreements because the 
court is merely respecting the custodial parent's duty and ability 
to make decisions in the child's best interests. The custodial 
parent's decision to assume a residence restraint on equal foot-
ing with the noncustodial parent is a reflection of both parents' 
concepts of what best protects the child's interests. In any event, 
the court is free to disallow "unreasonable" agreements at the 
inception. As a practical matter, the explicit safeguards imposed 
make it unlikely that many parents would enter into such a bur-
densome agreement unless they were on exceptionally good 
terms after the divorce. Finally, the arbitration requirement is 
necessary to ensure that the court's involvement in such post-
divorce matters is limited to respecting the wishes of the parties. 
Although these proposals may appear radical, they comport 
with traditional principles of custody and family autonomy 
160. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
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while eliminating the potential for harmful sex-based applica-
tion. They merely ratify and approve a sex-neutral basis for 
allowing relocation while protecting visitation and minimizing 
socially and individually expensive litigation. 
The proposals place no greater burden on the disappointed 
father who may lose under current principles of residence 
restrictions after costly litigation. They ensure that a mother, 
under threat of litigation, does not bargain away child support 
or other financial obligations in exchange for the "right" to move 
away and still retain custody. The proposals provide the private 
resolution of relocation issues. In addition, they further notions 
of judicial economy insofar as the level and nature of inquiry is 
limited to the issue of rearranging visitation or enforcing an 
arbitrator's award. Finally, they serve to decrease the burdens 
borne by a mother who wishes "to keep her children whose care 
she has so disproportionately assumed, especially where society 
continues to discriminate against her in all other areas."l62 
At least one court has recognized that these changes are 
necessary and appropriate: 
Were we writing on a clean slate, we could logi-
cally hold that the court is authorized . . . to 
award custody to a parent; that custody includes 
the authority to make parental decisions such as 
choice of residence; that there is no authority for 
the court to substitute its parental judgment in 
the form of conditions imposed upon custody; and 
that the court, after making an award, should get 
out of the litigants' lives unless continuation of 
the status quo would be injurious to the child and 
custody must be modified to avoid the injury 
163 
v. CONCLUSION 
Residence restrictions are frequently imposed on custodial 
162. Uviller, supra note 56, at 109. 
163. Meier v. Meier, 36 Or. App. 685, 688, 585 P.2d 713, 715 (1978), rev'd, 286 Or. 
437,595 P.2d 474 (1979). This Article did not discuss this case in text because it involved 
a proposed move to Canada and restrictions with respect to foreign countries involve 
considerations not within the scope of this discussion. 
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parents, but not on noncustodial parents. They have a disparate 
impact on women because the custodial parent is usually the 
mother. 
Residence restrictions analysis implicates a lack of sex-neu-
trality because it is contrary to traditional concepts of custody, 
rules of change of custody, and cannot therefore be justified any 
other way. The father's interests are balanced against the 
mother's under the guise of the "best interests of the child" 
standard. However, the balance is tipped in favor of the father 
because the mother's real interests are devalued or simply not 
added into the balance. The courts have focused on the custo-
dial parent's real interests only when they are confronted with a 
custodial father. 
The state's interest in protecting the child by placing the 
burden of residence restrictions on the custodial parent is frus-
trated because there is no consensus that a move will impair the 
child's interests. The court has already determined by the origi-
nal custody award that the custodial parent is best able to pro-
tect the child's interests. There is no demonstrable, sex-neutral 
reason why a move should require relitigation of that issue. 
The state cannot justify residence restrictions on the custo-
dial parent by asserting the noncustodial parent's visitation in-
terest. This rationale is explicitly sex-based because it favors the 
father's post-divorce interests. It is also unnecessary because the 
noncustodial parent's limited visitation interest can usually be 
adequately accommodated by alternative visitation 
arrangements. 
The state's intervention is not logically related to protecting 
the child or the visitation interest of a noncustodial parent; resi-
dence restrictions admit a sex-based justification with respect to 
a preference for freedom of movement for fathers and not for 
mothers. An analysis of the reported cases demonstrates that 
residence restrictions are sex-discriminatory in application. 
They should therefore be abandoned. The sex-neutral policies 
proposed above conform with traditional custody principles 
while eliminating state-imposed residence restrictions which 
cannot be justified on any level other than a sexually discrimina-
tory one. Justice and equality demand no less. 
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APPENDIX 
RESIDENCE RESTRICTION LITIGATION: 
A SAMPLING OF OUTCOMES 
CASE REASONS ALLEGED 
Tanttila v. Tanttila, 152 Colo. 446, To live "more cheaply," be closer to 
382 P.2d 798 (1963). relatives, more flexible work 
schedule 
Nelson v. Card, 162 Colo. 274,425 Remarriage and new husband got 
P.2d 276 (1967). better job 
Bernick v. Bernick, 31 Colo. App. Job opportunity 
485, 505 P.2d 14 (1972). 
In re Marriage of Young, 529 P.2d Relatives, job opportunities, post-
344 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974). divorce tensions 
Brandon v. Faulk, 326 So. 2d 76 Remarried, new husband's business 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied,. 
336 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1976). 
Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27 Remarried, better job for new 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). husband, relatives of both 
Garland v. Garland, 19 Ill. App. 3d Proposed remarriage and new job 
951, 312 N.E.2d 811 (1974). for both 
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CASE REASONS ALLEGED AT TRIAL ON APPEAL 0 0 
Tandy v. Tandy, 42 Ill. App. 3d 87, Relatives, job, health of mother and 
t"" 
t:;j 
355 N.E.2d 585 (1976). child Granted Affirmed ttj Z 
Gray v. Gray, 57 Ill. App. 3d 1, 372 New job, detailed arrangements for 0 
N.E.2d 909 (1978). child Granted Affirmed ~ 
Arquilla v. Arquilla, 85 Ill. App. 3d Better job, better cost of living, 
ttj 
c: 1090, 407 N.E.2d 948 (1980). advance arrangements for child Denied Reversed Z 
1-4 
In re Marriage of Burgham, 86 Ill. New house, new job, close to ~ App. 3d 341, 408 N.E.2d 37 boyfriend though no financial gain (:::1j 
(1980). Denied Reversed & remanded 00 ::3 
Brown v. Brown, 261 Iowa 591, 155 Better able to do things for child, ...:: 
N.W.2d 426 (1968). local situation depressing, no t"" 
opportunity for advancement Granted Reversed ~ 
In re Marriage of Gutermuth, 246 New job, desire to insulate child ~ N.W.2d 272 (Iowa 1976). from post-divorce tensions Denied Reversed 
~ In re Marriage of Lower, 269 Promotion with substantial increase, 
N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1978). more time with child, extensive ~ 










Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss3/1
I-' 
DISPOSITION (0 00 
CASE REASONS ALLEGED AT TRIAL ON APPEAL ~ 
Jafari v. Jafari, 204 Neb. 622, 284 New job, small increase in salary, 
N.W.2d 554 (1979). better advancement opportunities 
and advance arrangements for 
child Granted Affirmed 
Gottschall, v. Gottschall, 210 Neb. Fiance's new job will permit mother ~ 679, 316 N.W.2d 610 (1982). to remain at home with child; he 00 
relates to child well and advance 1-4 t:1 
arrangements made for child Granted Affirmed t:z:j Z 
D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. New job, relatives, better housing (1 
Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. 
t:z:j 
Div. 1976). Granted Affirmed ~ 
00 
Middlekauff v. Middlekauff, 161 Graduate education to get better job ~ N.J. Super. 84, 390 A.2d 1202 and detailed arrangements for 
(App. Div. 1978). child Denied Reversed 
(1 
:j 
Helentjaris v. Sudano, 194 N.J. New job with flexible work hours, 0 
Super. 220, 476 A.2d 828 (App. relatives Z 00 
Div. 1984). Denied Reversed 
In re Denberg, 34 Misc. 2d 980, 229 Ex-husband's remarriage soon after 
N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1962). divorce Denied n/a 
Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 Search for new job, escape social 
N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 limitations of community of 
(1981). married persons and impact of """ at 
inflation on tight budget Granted Reversed ~ 
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CASE REASONS ALLEGED AT TRIAL ON APPEAL c;:l 
0 
Martinez v. Konczewski, 56 N.Y.2d Remarriage and husband's new job l:-I t:I 
809, 441 N.E.2d 1117, 455 l:tj 
N.Y.S.2d 599 (1982). Granted Affirmed Z 
c;:l 
Weber v. Weber, 84 A.D.2d 940, 446 Made decision to move, remarried ~ N.Y.S.2d 676 (1981). out-of-state resident after hearing, l:tj 
but prior to order Denied Reversed c:: 
Priebe v. Priebe, 55 N.Y.2d 997, 434 Limited support by ex-husband, new Z ~ 
N.E.2d 708, 449 N.Y.S.2d 472 job and home obtained, limited ~ 
(1982). local opportunities Granted Reversed ~ 00 
Courten v. Courten, 92 A.D.2d 579, Join fiance, new job, limited local ~ 459 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1983). opportunities Denied Affirmed 
l:-I 
Klein v. Klein, 93 A.D.2d 807, 460 $1,200 support offered by ex- ~ N.Y.S.2d 607 (1983). husband insufficient to allow 
continued residence in appropriate ~ 
neighborhood, relatives would help ~ financially and emotionally Granted Affirmed 
~ 
Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82 New husband's job will provide 
(N.D. 1981). income to support mother and 
,....., 
<: 
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